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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ZENIMAX MEDIA INC. and
ID SOFTWARE LLC,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs
)
)
v.
)
)
OCULUS VR, LLC, PALMER LUCKEY, )
FACEBOOK, INC., BRENDAN IRIBE,
)
and JOHN CARMACK,
)
)
Defendants
)
)

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:14-cv-01849-K

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
PROFESSORS IN FAVOR OF JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
__________________________________________________________________

John A. Conway (TX 00790494)
LADUE CURRAN & KUEHN LLC
100 East Wayne Street, Suite 300
South Bend, IN 46601
(574) 968-0760
(574) 968-0761 (fax)
jconway@lck-law.com
Counsel for Amici
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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici Curiae are law professors who teach and write in intellectual property
law, particularly trademark law. Amici have no stake in the outcome of this case.
Their sole interest is in the orderly development of trademark law in a way that
serves the public interest.*
Stacey Dogan
Boston University School of Law
Leah Chan Grinvald
Suffolk University Law School
Michael Grynberg
DePaul College of Law
Mark P. McKenna
Notre Dame Law School
Jessica Silbey
Northeastern University School of Law
Rebecca Tushnet
Georgetown Law

*

Amici sign this brief in their personal capacities. Institutions are listed for
identification purposes only.
v
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff’s false designation of origin and false endorsement claims, such as they
are, rest on the assertion that defendants falsely represented themselves as the origin
of intellectual property on which the Oculus Rift is based. Those claims are barred
by Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), which holds
that only confusion regarding the origin of physical goods is actionable under the
Lanham Act.
I.

ARGUMENT
A. ZeniMax’s False Designation of Origin Claim is Barred by Dastar
The gravamen of ZeniMax’s false designation of origin claim is difficult to

discern but appears to rest on the allegation that “Defendants wrongfully held out
ZeniMax’s intellectual property as their own” (ECF 968 at 4) when “the Oculus Rift
Kickstarter video[] misleadingly attribute[d] Carmack’s work at ZeniMax to
Oculus.” (ECF 963 at 20).1 That claim is plainly barred by Dastar v. Twentieth
Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23 (2003), because it alleges false designation of the origin
See also Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Entry of
Permanent Injunction (“Injunction Brief) at 1 (characterizing the jury verdict as
having found that Defendants falsely designated “ZeniMax’s technology as its own”)
(emphasis added); id. at 6 (suggesting that Defendants built and promoted a business
based on ZeniMax’s technology); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) at 1
(claiming that Defendants stole, copied, and passed off as their own “breakthrough
virtual reality (VR) technology” developed by ZeniMax).
1

1
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of intangible content (intellectual property) rather than of any tangible goods, as the
Lanham Act requires. Thus, ZeniMax’s false designation of origin claim would be
barred even if ZeniMax were right that defendants’ presentations falsely suggested
that defendants created the technology on which the Oculus Rift devices operate,
because any confusion about the origin of the technology is irrelevant for Lanham
Act purposes. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32 (“as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase “origin
of goods” is in our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated
the ideas or communications that “goods” embody or contain”).
Dastar copied footage from the Crusade in Europe television series originally
released by Twentieth Century Fox and re-used that footage in its own video series
without attributing the footage to Fox. According to Fox, that unattributed use
constituted reverse passing off: Dastar was passing off Fox’s content as though it
were Dastar’s own, thereby falsely designating the origin of the video series in
violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27. That section makes
actionable use of
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).

2
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Because some lower courts had allowed claims in this sort of context, the
Supreme Court was forced to consider the meaning of the phrase “origin of goods”
in the Lanham Act. And the Court concluded that “the most natural understanding
of ‘origin’ of ‘goods’ – the source of wares – is the producer of the tangible product
sold in the marketplace.” Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31. The concept of origin “might be
stretched,” the Court allowed, “to include not only the actual producer,” but the party
who “stood behind production of the physical product.” Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32.
“Origin of goods,” however, is “incapable of connoting the person or entity that
originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.” Id. at 32.
Whatever the range of relationships that might legitimately be regarded as those of
legal “origin,” they must relate to the physical goods and not merely the intangible
content embodied therein.
This case is strikingly similar to General Universal Systems, Inc. v. Lee, 379
F.3d 131 (5th Cir. 2004). In that case, General Universal Systems (GUS) sued HAL,
two of its officers, and several of HAL’s customers (collectively “HAL”), claiming
that HAL infringed its copyright in a freight management system, misappropriated
trade secrets, violated the Lanham Act, and breached a contract. Id. at 137. More
specifically, GUS alleged that the defendants made an unauthorized copy of GUS’s

3
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freight tracking software and marketed that software under the defendant’s own
mark.2
The Fifth Circuit rejected GUS’s false designation of origin claim, noting that
the Supreme Court had “carefully distinguished Lanham Act claims from copyright
claims”; unlike copyright, Lanham Act claims were “not designed to protect
originality or creativity.” Id. at 149 quoting Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. GUS’s false
designation of origin claims were barred because GUS had not accused the
defendants of “taking tangible copies of its software, removing its trademarks, and
selling [the tangible copies] as its own,” but instead asserted that defendants had
“copied the ideas, concepts, structures, and sequences embodied in” its software. Id.
at 149. “In sum and substance, GUS’s claim [was] simply a claim that [defendants]
ha[d] infringed its copyright” in its software. Id. As the Fifth Circuit recognized,
“Dastar makes clear that such claims are not actionable under § 43(a).” Id.
General Universal Systems reflects Dastar’s central holding: only
misrepresentations of the origin of physical goods are actionable under §
43(a)(1)(A). Other sorts of misrepresentations, including but not limited to

Notably, GUS contended that the defendants’ MEPAW software copied GUS’s
software with only minor modifications, and that Lanham Act claims do not require
the sort of Altai-style abstraction/filtration analysis required in copyright cases. It
therefore contended that it could establish false designation of origin simply on the
basis of the alleged similarity of the defendant’s software.
2

4
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misrepresentations of the origin of technology, are not actionable as false
designation of origin. See Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc.,
796 F.3d 576, 586-87 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Boiled down, then, the district court's liability
finding on the reverse passing off claim depended upon its conclusion that Pace
falsely designated the cloned products’ ‘origin’ by failing to represent to its
customers that the products—although manufactured by Pace—stemmed from ideas
or intellectual property that were initially brought to the table by Best. But as the
Supreme Court has pointed out, the Lanham Act protects the ability to control one’s
brand; it does not protect the ability to control one’s inventions or innovations.”);
Geovector Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 2016 WL 6662996, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 16, 2016) (“GeoVector’s Lanham Act claim is based on Samsung’s alleged
appropriation of GeoVector’s augmented reality ideas to create and sell its own
augmented reality technology. But the Lanham Act does not prohibit conduct of this
kind; it applies only to the appropriation of tangible goods, not intellectual
property.”).3

A broader range of misrepresentations (regarding the “the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or
commercial activities”) are actionable as false advertising under § 43(a)(1)(B). 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). To sustain a false advertising cause of action, the plaintiff
must still establish that claims about the origin of technology do in fact pertain to
the “nature, characteristics, [or] qualities” of the actual goods. Cf. Baden Sports, Inc.
v. Molten USA, Inc., 556 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (barring Baden’s Lanham Act
false advertising claims, which alleged that Molten had falsely claimed to be the
3

5
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ZeniMax’s false designation of origin claim clearly fails under this standard.
Oculus is unambiguously the origin of the Rift devices; there was therefore nothing
remotely false about Oculus designating itself as the origin of those devices. Given
Dastar, the basis on which ZeniMax defends the false designation of origin
verdict—Defendants’ purportedly false claims about inventorship or the origin of
technology—is insufficient as a matter of law.
B.

ZeniMax’s Claims Based on Use of Trademarks Within the Slide Deck
Fail

ZeniMax refers in passing to Defendants’ use of ZeniMax’s trademarks within
the slide deck Defendants presented to potential investors, implying that it was those

origin of “innovative” technology in its basketballs); see also OptoLum, Inc. v. Cree,
Inc., 122 U.S.P.Q.2d 1208 (D. Ariz. 2017) (“A contrary holding—that is, a finding
that false claims to inventorship are actionable under § 43(a)—impermissibly ‘could
create overlap between the Lanham and Patent Acts.’”) (citation omitted); Smartix
Int'l Corp. v. MasterCard Int’l LLC, No. 06 CV 5174 (GBD), 2008 WL 4444554, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008) (collecting cases) (failure to acknowledge “originating
source of the technology underlying defendants’ affinity card programs[] is not a
misrepresentation as to the inherent ‘nature, characteristics [or] quality’ of the
programs themselves.”). A plaintiff asserting false advertising causes of action must,
moreover, establish elements that do not apply false designation of origin claims.
Most notably, such plaintiffs must “prove materiality by establishing ‘that the
defendant's deception is likely to influence the purchasing decision.’” Forest Grp.,
Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., No. CIV.A. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206, at *7 (S.D. Tex.
July 29, 2008) (quoting North Amer. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d
1211, 1226 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted)), vacated in
part on other grounds, 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
6
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uses that falsely designated the origin of the Oculus Rift and/or constituted false
endorsement. Injunction Brief at 10-11, ¶¶ 19-26; Opposition to Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law at 5-6.
To the extent ZeniMax’s false designation of origin claim is based on
Defendants’ use of ZeniMax’s video game trademarks in their presentations to
potential investors, that claim is indistinguishable from the trademark infringement
claim on which the jury awarded zero damages despite being charged that ZeniMax
had recognized trademarks in those marks. Court’s Charge to the Jury, p. 62. The
Court’s jury instructions distinguished false designation of origin and trademark
infringement precisely on the basis that a party can recover for false designation of
origin even though the person is not the owner of a trademark. Compare Court’s
Charge to the Jury, p. 61 (requiring proof of ownership of legally protectable
trademarks for trademark infringement claim) and p. 65 (allowing false designation
of origin claim even though no ownership of protectable trademarks). ZeniMax
attempts to recharacterize its trademark infringement claim as false designation of
origin to avoid the jury’s conclusion that it was not entitled to damages for
Defendants’ use of ZeniMax’s marks, even though the substantive elements of a
false designation of origin claim (other than the presence of a registered trademark)

7
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are the same as for violation of §32 of the Lanham Act, which provides remedies for
infringement of registered trademarks.4
On these facts, the doctrine of nominative fair use also overlaps with the
teaching of Dastar. The nominative fair use doctrine finds certain uses of trademarks
nonactionable because their use is truthful and nonconfusing as a matter of law. See
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010). To the
extent ZeniMax’s claims are based on Defendants’ use of ZeniMax’s marks within
the slide deck, such use was purely nominative; Defendants used the marks to
identify ZeniMax’s products and to indicate that those games were compatible with

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992) (“whether we call
a violation infringement, unfair competition, or false designation of origin, the test
is identical—is there a likelihood of confusion?”) (Stevens, J., concurring); Audi AG
v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) (courts “use the same test to decide
whether there has been trademark infringement, unfair competition, or false
designation of origin: the likelihood of confusion between the two marks.”);
Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prod. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 216-217 (5th Cir. 1985)
(analyzing both claims together); New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d
1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Whether we call the violation infringement, unfair
competition or false designation of origin, the test is identical.”); Applause Prod.
Grp., L.L.C. v. Showtime Events Inc., 2017 WL 1906588 (D. Md. May 4, 2017)(“The
Lanham Act specifies that the test of liability for a false designation of origin claim
is the same ‘likelihood of confusion analysis’ arising in a traditional trademark
infringement claim.”) (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:18 (4th ed. 2003, March 2017 update); Philip Morris
USA, Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667, 674 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (“The elements of
trademark infringement and false designation of origin [under the Lanham Act] are
identical, and the same evidence will establish both claims.”).
4

8
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the Oculus Rift, not to claim that ZeniMax stood behind Defendants’ product.
Importantly, the error with respect to the Dastar-barred false designation of origin
claim contaminated the jury’s verdict even though the Court instructed the jury on
nominative fair use. As the Court’s instruction noted, nominative fair use requires
that the defendant (1) make a use to refer to the plaintiff, (2) use “only so much of
the trademarks as was reasonably necessary,” and (3) do nothing else to suggest
sponsorship or endorsement of the defendant’s product by the plaintiff. Court’s
Charge to the Jury, p. 67. Both factors (2) and (3) are profoundly affected by the
conflation of origin of goods or services with the origin of ideas or technology.
C.

ZeniMax Cannot Avoid Dastar by Characterizing its Claims in False
Endorsement Terms

Perhaps recognizing the legal inadequacy of its false designation of origin
claim, ZeniMax suggests in its most recent Opposition brief that Defendants’
conduct amounted to false designation of origin and/or trademark infringement
because it falsely suggested that ZeniMax was endorsing Oculus’s product. See
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) at 2, 5-6. False endorsement is, of course, a
distinct Lanham Act theory, and one on which the jury was not charged. See Court’s
Charge to the Jury at 53-56 (charging on unfair competition claims), 61-71 (charging
on trademark infringement and false designation claims). But regardless, to the
9
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extent ZeniMax’s claims depend on the allegation that Defendants’ conduct
suggested that Defendants, rather than ZeniMax, had created virtual reality
technology or the VR demo, those claims are barred by Dastar however they are
denominated. See Appjigger GmbH v. BLU Prods., Inc., 2016 WL 4119720 at *4
(S.D. Fla. March 7, 2016) (“A defendant does not violate the Lanham Act's false
advertising provisions by promoting its product while failing to properly attribute
the source of the underlying technology embodied in the product.”). ZeniMax cannot
escape that result by characterizing the conduct as falsely suggesting and
endorsement rather than falsely designating the origin of the technology. See
Rudovsky v. West Publ. Corp., 2010 WL 2804844 at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2010)
(rejecting plaintiff’s false advertising and false endorsement claims based on false
designation of authorship); Antidote Int’l Films, Inc. v. Bloomsbury Publ’g, PLC,
467 F.Supp.2d 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that
misrepresentations of authorship falsely suggested the affiliation or sponsorship of
the true author, and noting that the “holding necessarily applies with equal force to
any claim for “false ... representation[s]” with respect to the “affiliation ... of [one]
person with another person,” where, as here, one person is the publisher of a novel
and the other is the author of the novel, because the holding of Dastar would be
meaningless if a false authorship claim could be recast in this manner”).

10
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter judgment as a matter of law in
favor of Defendants.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

By: _________________________
John A. Conway (TX 00790494)
LADUE CURRAN & KUEHN LLC
100 East Wayne Street, Suite 300
South Bend, IN 46601
(574) 968-0760
(574) 968-0761 (fax)
jconway@lck-law.com
Counsel for Amici
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